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INTRODUCTION  
 
 Each year Americans spend billions on dietary supplements that 
promise to do everything from treating colds and enhancing memory 
to curbing hot flashes.1 However, in spite of the lofty promises made 
by the manufacturers of such products, a recent study of herbal 
supplements by the journal BNC MEDICINE found that most of the 
products tested were of poor quality and contained considerable 
ingredient substitution.2 In November 2015, the Justice Department 
announced that it was bringing criminal and civil cases against over 
                                                 
*J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., International Studies, University of Wisconsin–Madison. I would 
like to thank Professor Hal Morris, our Executive Editor Matt Smart, and my fiancé 
Jocelyn for all of their support.  
1 Anahad O’Connor, Herbal Supplements Are Often Not What They Seem, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/science/herbal-
supplements-are-often-not-what-they-seem.html?_r=0.  
2 Meghan Grguric et al., DNA Barcoding Detects Contamination and 
Substitution in North American Herbal Products, BMC MEDICINE (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/11/222/abstract.  
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100 makers of dietary supplements3. The complaints alleged, inter 
alia, the sale of products that make health or disease treatment claims 
unsupported by adequate scientific evidence.4  
What legal remedy does the injured consumer of a low cost 
product like a dietary supplement have? One option is the class action. 
Guided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is a form 
of representative litigation: one or more named class representatives 
bring a claim on behalf of many absent class members, and those class 
members are bound by the outcome of the representatives’ litigation.5 
The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individually named parties only.6 
The core policy behind the class action, as stated by the United States 
Supreme Court, is “to overcome the problem that small recoveries do 
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action 
prosecuting his or her rights.”7  
Procedurally, after a class claim has been filed, a court must 
determine by order whether to certify the suit as a class action.8 Rule 
23 provides express requirements for the certification of class actions 
in federal court.9 In addition to Rule 23’s express requirements, courts 
have developed additional criteria, known as the “implicit 
requirements,” for a class to be certifiable.10 One of these judicially 
created rules is that the proposed class be “ascertainable.”11 To meet 
the ascertainability requirement, a plaintiff must show that the 
                                                 
3 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and Federal Partners 
Announce Enforcement Actions of Dietary Supplement Cases (Nov. 17, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-federal-partners-announce-
enforcement-actions-dietary-supplement-cases. 
4 Id.  
5 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (5th ed. 
2015).  
6 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011). 
7 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace 
v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)). 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
9 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:1. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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proposed class is defined in reference to objective criteria.12 This view 
has been adopted in the Seventh Circuit, where courts have held that 
“a class must be sufficiently definite that its members are 
ascertainable.”13 Put another way, a court must be able know or readily 
ascertain who will be a member of the class.14  
In recent years, the issue of class ascertainability has split the 
circuit courts. Some courts have expanded the ascertainability test 
beyond the definition described above.15 These courts have held that it 
is not enough that the proposed class is objectively defined; the 
plaintiff must also show a “reliable and administratively feasible 
mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall 
within the class definition.”16 This requirement, which the Seventh 
Circuit has labeled “heightened ascertainability,”17 has been used to 
defeat class certification in several consumer fraud cases involving 
low-cost products, including several against makers of dietary 
supplements.18 
In Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, the Seventh Circuit addressed 
whether Rule 23 imposed a heightened ascertainability requirement in 
granting class certification.19 The plaintiff in Mullins sought to certify 
a class of all people who purchased the defendant’s allegedly 
fraudulently marketed dietary supplement – Instaflex Joint Support.20 
The court held that nothing in Rule 23 mentioned or implied the 
                                                 
12 Id. at § 3:3. 
13 Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 493 (7th Cir. 2012). 
14 Id. at 495. 
15 Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 
F.3d 349, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 
593-94 (3d Cir. 2012). 
16 Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355. 
17 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). 
18 Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015); 
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 303; In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199 DDP 
RZX, 2014 WL 1225184, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014). 
19 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657. 
20 Id. at 658. 
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heightened ascertainability requirement.21 Further, the court ruled that 
this requirement had the effect of denying class certification in cases 
involving low-cost goods or services.22 In such cases, the court 
explained, a class action is the only viable way to pursue valid but 
small individual claims.23 
This article will explore the Seventh Circuit’s position on class 
ascertainability, through an analysis of Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 
and will contrast this approach with the heightened ascertainability 
requirement adopted by other federal circuit courts of appeal. 
Specifically, this article argues that the Seventh Circuit was right to 
reject the heightened ascertainability requirement. Part I provides an 
outline of the requirements of Rule 23 and examines the traditional 
standards that courts have used to certify class actions. Part II explores 
the development of the heighted ascertainability requirement and the 
policy concerns behind its creation. Part III examines the facts and 
holding in Mullins and details the Seventh Circuit’s point-by-point 
rebuttal to the justifications other federal circuit courts have used for 
applying heightened ascertainability. Part IV argues that the 
heightened ascertainability requirement is superfluous, has deleterious 
effects on class plaintiffs and should be abandoned. Finally, Part V 
proposes changes to Rule 23 that the Judicial Conference’s Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure could adopt in order to codify the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach to class certification.  
 
I. RULE 23, TRADITIONAL ASCERTAINABILITY AND 
SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS ON CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
Rule 23 took its current form in a 1966 revision to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.24 According to its principal drafter, 
Benjamin Kaplan, the Rule is intended to “rebuild the law on 
functional lines responsive to . . . recurrent life patterns which call for 
                                                 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 668. 
23 Id. at 662. 
24 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997). 
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mass litigation through representative parties.”25 The Rule has two 
primary purposes. First, it permits the vindication of the rights of 
groups of people who individually would not have effective strength to 
bring their opponents into court.26 Second, by permitting a 
representative to sue on behalf of a large group of people, it provides 
an efficient method of litigation.27 
In class action suits filed pursuant to Rule 23, a court’s ruling on 
certification is the threshold question and often the most important 
decision in the litigation.28 As the Third Circuit noted, “orders granting 
class certification may expose defendants to enormous liability while 
orders denying certification may effectively eviscerate the plaintiffs' 
ability to recover.”29 Rule 23 sets forth the express requirements the 
plaintiff seeking certification must meet.30 First, class plaintiffs must 
show all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a).31 Then, a court must consider 
whether the class fits within one of the three categories set forth in 
Rule 23(b).32 In addition to Rule 23, plaintiffs must also meet the 
judicially created ascertainability requirement.33 Rule 23 does not 
specify a particular burden of proof, nor has the Supreme Court 
weighed in on the matter.34 Currently, some federal circuit courts, 
including the Seventh Circuit,35 have moved towards a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, while others have 
                                                 
25 Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 Yale L.J. 2354, 2356 (2015) 
(quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 
497 (1969).  
26 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617. 
27 Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974). 
28 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 
(1980). 
29 In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 93 F. App'x 345, 350 (3d Cir. 2004).  
30 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614. 
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
32 In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., PNC Bank NA, 
795 F.3d 380, 392 (3d Cir. 2015). 
33 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:1. 
34 Id. at § 7:21. 
35 Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
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articulated a lower standard.36 The following section describes each of 
the certification elements in detail.  
 
A.  Rule 23(a)’s Express Requirements 
 
1. Rule 23(a): Required Characteristics of a Class Action 
 
The named class representative must meet each of the below 
elements in order to certify her class. Rule 23(a) establishes the four 
necessary components of a class action:  
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable (numerosity);  
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class 
(commonality);  
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class (adequacy).37 
The first two prerequisites, numerosity and commonality, are aimed at 
absent class members, while the latter two tests, typicality and 
adequacy, focus on the desired qualifications of the named class 
representative.38  
Rule 23(a)(1), the numerosity requirement, is intended to improve 
judicial economy and social efficiency.39 This rule does not articulate a 
minimum number of members for a class to exist, but instead 
addresses whether joinder would be impractical.40 Rule 23(a)(1) 
solves the problem of courts being overrun by a large number of 
individuals with similar claims.41 In addition, it allows people who are 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 1:2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).  
38 Id. 
39 Id. at § 3.1. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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unable to fund litigation themselves to join the claim of a class 
plaintiff.42  
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement is “easily met in most 
cases.”43 To constitute commonality, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the class members “have suffered the same injury.”44 Put 
differently, the plaintiff must show there is a single issue of law or fact 
that is common across all class members.45 Like the numerosity 
requirement, commonality serves both efficiency and fairness goals.46 
Adjudicating a question once, rather than repeatedly, is more efficient 
and avoids the unfairness that could result from inconsistent 
outcomes.47 Moreover, if a common issue of law or fact is not shared 
among class members, there is no basis upon which to bind one party 
to the outcome of another's litigation.48 
A plaintiff satisfies the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement if 
“her claim and those of the class arise from the same event or pattern 
or practice and are based on the same legal theory.”49 The heart of the 
typicality requirement is that plaintiff and the class members have an 
interest in prevailing on similar legal claims.50 Thus, similar to 
numerosity and commonality, typicality achieves judicial economy 
because the named plaintiff, by litigating her own case, simultaneously 
advances the interests of the absent class members.51 Class member’s 
claims need not be completely factually similar; however, they must 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-08030, 2013 
WL 499474, at *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2013). 
44 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
45 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:18.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Singer v. AT&T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 689 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
50 Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 96 F.R.D. 567, 570 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983). 
51 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:16 (12th ed. 
2015).  
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be similar enough so that the interests of the class members will be 
fairly and adequately protected in their absence.52  
Lastly, Rule 23(a)(4) establishes the adequacy requirement. This 
inquiry serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties 
and the class they seek to represent.53 It ensures that named plaintiffs 
and their counsel understand that they are acting in a representative 
capacity on behalf of all class members and will prosecute the action 
fairly, vigorously, and competently.54 Distinctions between the named 
plaintiff and absent class members are permitted; only affirmative 
antagonism between the named representative and the class will defeat 
certification under Rule 23(a)(4).55 This requirement is well illustrated 
by Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.56 There, the Supreme Court 
held that a group of plaintiffs who had suffered injuries from exposure 
to asbestos could not adequately represent a class of persons who had 
merely been exposed to asbestos and might develop injuries later.57 
The Court found a conflict of interest between the named class 
representatives and the absent members because the former had an 
interest maximizing immediate payouts, while the latter had an interest 
in preserving settlement funds for future claims.58 Thus, due process 
and fairness form the core policy behind Rule 24(a)(4); the 
requirement ensures that the named plaintiff will pursue her interests 
adequately in order to produce a judgment that will justly bind the 
absent class members.59 
Though the above requirements are distinct, they are interrelated 
and tend to overlap.60 For example, commonality and typicality each 
serve as markers for whether the named plaintiff's claim and the absent 
member’s claims are sufficiently intertwined so that the interests of the 
                                                 
52 In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 598 (3d Cir. 2009). 
53 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997). 
54 McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 4:26. 
55 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:58. 
56 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 594. 
57 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:58. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at § 3:50.  
60 McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 4:1. 
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class members will be fairly protected in their absence.61 In this 
manner, commonality and typicality also tend to merge with the 
adequacy-of-representation requirement.62 Nevertheless, each of the 
four requirements retains independent significance and all must be 
present for a class to be certified.63  
 
2. Rule 23(b): Types of Class Actions 
 
If the class representative satisfies each of the requirements of 
Rule 23(a), she then must show that that a class action is maintainable 
under any one of the three categories set forth in Rule 23(b).64 The 
Rule 23(b)(1) class action addresses cases where the defendant is 
bound to treat class members alike or where class members are 
making claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all of the claims. 65 
The Rule 23(b)(2) class action is relevant for cases where broad, class-
wide injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary.66 Because issues of 
class ascertainability overwhelmingly pertain to Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions, discussed infra, this Comment article provides only the above 
brief descriptions of the first two types of Rule 23(b) actions. Rule 
23(b)(3) states: 
 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied 
and if . . . 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy. 
                                                 
61 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982). 
62 Id. 
63 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 1:2. 
64 McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 5:1.  
65 Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412 (5th Cir. 
1998)). 
66 Id. 
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(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling 
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 67 
 
Put simply, a Rule 23(b)(3) class action permits judgments for 
money that bind all class members, except those who opt out.68 This is 
the most common category for small claims class actions, and is 
commonly referred to as the “money damage” class action.69 Courts 
have aggregated money damages suits into Rule 23(b)(3) class actions 
when many individuals have small damage claims.70 In these 
situations, aggregation is efficient because it forces wrongdoers to 
internalize the cost of their wrongdoing and captures the positive 
externalities associated with litigation.71 The Supreme Court 
articulated this concept by noting, “the aggregation of individual 
claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to 
the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of 
government.”72 
There are two elements at play in Rule 23(b)(3): predominance, 
(common questions must predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members); and superiority, (class resolution must be 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy).73 The predominance requirement, 
while similar to Rule 23(a), is even more demanding.74 The Supreme 
Court has held that it is a court's duty to take a “close look” at whether 
                                                 
67 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
68 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997). 
69 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 4:1. 
70 Id. at § 4:47. 
71 Id. 
72 Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
73 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23) (emphasis added). 
74 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432, (2013). 
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common questions among class members predominate over individual 
ones.75 Thus, a court may not assume that because common issues 
may be implicated in the trial of every class member's claim, these 
issues are significant enough to support certification.76 At the same 
time, common issues must only predominate; they do not have to be 
dispositive of the litigation.77 
In considering whether a plaintiff meets the superiority 
requirement, courts consider the factors in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D), listed 
above.78 However, these factors are not exhaustive.79 In essence, 
superiority analysis is composed of three considerations.80 First, 
whether alternative methods of adjudication are available.81 Second, a 
comparison of fairness between alternative methods and the class 
action.82 And third, a comparison of efficiency of each method of 
adjudicating the claims.83 For example, courts have denied 
certification for lack of superiority in consumer class actions where the 
defendant instituted a refund program to compensate purchasers of a 
defective product.84 In this situation, one court held, “it makes little 
sense to certify a class where a class mechanism is unnecessary to 
afford the class members redress.”85 
Lastly, an important distinction between Rule 23(b)(3) actions and 
Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) actions is the absent class members’ opportunity 
to opt out of the litigation. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires a court that has 
certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class to notify members “that the court will 
exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion.”86 This 
                                                 
75 Id. (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997)). 
76 McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 5:23. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at § 5:63. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (citing Turcios v. Carma Labs., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 638, 649 (C.D. Cal. 
2014)). 
85 Turcios, 296 F.R.D. at 649.  
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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rule stipulates that such notice must be “the best notice that is 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” The “opt 
out” requirement, along with the other Rule 23(b)(3) prerequisites, 
provides an added procedural protection not seen elsewhere in Rule 
23. These procedural protections have been cited by the Supreme 
Court as evidence that Rule 23(b)(3) actions allow for class 
certification under a much wider set of circumstances than the other 
types of actions.87 
 
B.  Traditional Ascertainability 
 
The ascertainability prerequisite is an “implicit” requirement of 
Rule 23. 88 Its central inquiry is whether the proposed class can be 
defined in reference to objective criteria.89 For example, classes that 
are defined by subjective criteria, such as by a person's state of mind, 
fail the ascertainability requirement.90 Courts generally regard 
ascertainability as a precursor to Rule 23, and have held that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of pleading an ascertainable class before the 
court proceeds to a Rule 23 inquiry.91 As previously noted, the 
ascertainability requirement is judicially created and is often 
legitimized by courts as being inherent to the structure of Rule 23 and, 
therefore, an “axiomatic” part of class certification.92  
Courts have employed the traditional ascertainability precondition 
since the late 1960’s, shortly after Rule 23’s revision in 1966.93 For 
example, in 1970, the Fifth Circuit denied certification of a proposed 
class of “residents . . . active in the ‘peace movement’ who have been 
harassed and intimidated” by police.”94 The court held that the 
                                                 
87 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011). 
88 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:3. 
89 Id. 
90 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. (quoting Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
         93 See Hardy v. U.S. Steel Corp., 289 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Ala. 1967) 
(holding a class must be defined adequately at the beginning of the lawsuit).  
94 DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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proposed class did not “constitute an adequately defined or clearly 
ascertainable class contemplated by Rule 23.”95 While the objective 
definition requirement is necessary for ascertainability, a court does 
not have to know the identity of each class member before 
certification.96 Evidence that the court will able to identify class 
members at some stage of the proceeding is sufficient.97 One district 
court noted that a rule requiring knowledge of all class members at the 
certification stage would be particularly problematic for consumer 
class actions, where the named plaintiff would have no capability of 
identifying others who purchased a similar defective or deceptive 
product.98 “If class actions could be defeated because membership was 
difficult to ascertain at the class certification stage, there would be no 
such thing as a consumer class action.”99 
There are two primary policy goals that justify traditional 
ascertainability. First, it protects plaintiffs by enabling notice to be 
provided and by defining who is entitled to relief.100 Second, it 
protects defendants by enabling a final judgment that clearly identifies 
who is bound by it.101 Judge Hamilton articulated these justifications 
in Mullins, explaining that vague classes pose a problem because “a 
court needs to be able to identify who will receive notice, who will 
share in any recovery, and who will be bound by a judgment.”102   
 
II. THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY   
 
The Third Circuit first articulated the heighted ascertainability 
requirement in the federal appellate courts in Marcus v. BMW of North 
America, LLC.103 There, the plaintiff sought to certify a class of 
current and former owners and lessees of BMW vehicles equipped 
                                                 
95 Id. 
96 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:3. 
97 Id. 
98 Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013). 
99 Id. 
100 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:3 
101 Id. 
102 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015). 
103 Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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with allegedly defective tires over a four-year period.104 Defendant 
BMW kept no records of the vehicles it sold that were outfitted with 
the tires in question.105 Thus, potential class members could only 
identify themselves via affidavits.106 The court disapproved of this, 
stating that ascertaining a class by potential class member’s “say so” 
would have serious due process implications.107 In overturning the 
district court’s certification order, the Third Circuit found that Marcus’ 
class definition raised “serious ascertainability issues” because Marcus 
failed to present a “reliable, administratively feasible” way to identify 
class members.108 The court held that if class members are impossible 
to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or “mini-
trials,” then a class action is inappropriate.109  
Marcus diverged from the established ascertainability test by 
adding a second prong: in addition to proving that the class can be 
defined by objective criteria, a plaintiff must also prove that there is an 
administratively feasible mechanism for identifying class members.110 
The court identified three policy reasons for its new rule.111 First, it 
eliminates “serious administrative burdens” by requiring that class 
members be easily identifiable.112 Second, it protects absent class 
members by ensuring the “best notice practicable” under Rule 23(c)(2) 
in a Rule 23(b)(3) action.113 Third, it protects defendants by providing 
clarity as to who will be bound by the litigation.114 
One year later, the Third Circuit decided Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
a case widely cited to support the heightened ascertainability 
                                                 
104 Id. at 592. 
105 Id. at 593-94. 
106 Id. at 594. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 593-94. 
109 Id. at 593. 
110 Daniel Luks, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class 
Member, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2359, 2380 (2014).  
111 Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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requirement.115 In Carrera, plaintiff alleged that defendant falsely and 
deceptively advertised its dietary supplement, WeightSmart, by 
claiming it enhanced metabolism.116 Carrera’s class of “all persons 
who had purchased WeightSmart in Florida” was certified by the 
district court.117 The Third Circuit vacated the certification order, 
holding that Carrera had failed to provide a reliable, administratively 
feasible mechanism for identifying the class.118 Like the plaintiff in 
Marcus, Carrera sought to ascertain his class via affidavits of class 
members.119 However, Carrera also proposed to identify class 
members through retailer sales records.120 To support this, Carrera 
presented a declaration from a settlement claims processor, which 
stated there are ways to verify the types of affidavits at issue and 
screen out fraudulent claims.121 
The Third Circuit rejected Carrera’s proposed model to identify 
class members, stating that he had presented no evidence that retailers 
actually possessed the relevant sales records.122 The court held that a 
plaintiff cannot merely propose a method of ascertaining a class 
without any evidentiary support that the method will be successful.123 
The court articulated three reasons for its holding. First, allowing a 
plaintiff to ascertain class members by affidavit or via another method 
not proven to be effective would “eviscerate” a defendant’s due 
process right to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims.124 
The court explained that due process requires that a defendant be able 
to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove class 
                                                 
115 Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015); Byrd v. 
Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition 
Co., No. 12-2907-SC, 2014 WL 580696, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014). 
116 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 309. 
123 Id. at 306. 
124 Id. at 307. 
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membership.125 Second the court posited that a poorly ascertained 
class would lead to mini-trials to determine class membership.126 This 
would diminish efficiency, a benefit expected in a class action.127 
Third, a poorly ascertained class could lead to the distribution of 
fraudulent or inaccurate claims.128 The court averred that it would be 
unfair to absent class members to have their recovery diluted by such 
claims.129 Moreover, it would be unfair to defendants if claim dilution 
resulted in absent class members bringing new claims.130 The court 
hypothesized that this could occur if the absent class members argued 
that the plaintiff did not adequately represent them because he had 
proceeded with the ligation with the understanding that the absent 
class members could get less than full relief.131 
After Carrera, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and several 
district courts adopted the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability 
approach to their class certification analysis.132 This has resulted in the 
denial of certification where the plaintiff has failed to show a reliable, 
administratively feasible way to identify class members.133 For 
example, in Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a case factually 
similar to Mullins, a proposed class of purchasers of the defendant’s 
allegedly deceptively advertised dietary supplement was denied 
certification.134 The Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot 
establish ascertainability simply by asserting that class members can 
be identified using the defendant's records; the plaintiff must also 
establish that the records are in fact useful for identification purposes, 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 310. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015); 
Warnick v. Dish Network LLC, 301 F.R.D. 551, 556 (D. Colo. 2014); In re Skelaxin 
(Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 2014). 
133 Warnick, 301 F.R.D. at 557.  
134 Karhu, 621 F. App'x at 948. 
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and that identification will be administratively feasible.135 As the 
below discussion will show, heightened ascertainability has been very 
detrimental to class plaintiffs. However, with its holding in Mullins, 
the Seventh Circuit has provided an important counterweight to this 
approach.136  
III. MULLINS V. DIRECT DIGITAL, LLC   
 
A. Background and District Court Decision 
 
On March 8, 2013, Vince Mullins filed a multi-state class action 
complaint against Direct Digital, LLC (“Direct Digital”), alleging 
violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
502/1, et seq. and similar laws in other states.137 Mullins claimed that 
the statements on the label of defendant’s product, Instaflex Joint 
Support (Instaflex), were false and misleading, and as a result, Mullins 
and members of his proposed class purchased a product that did not 
perform as advertised.138 The statements at issue included claims that 
Instaflex would “relieve discomfort,” “improve flexibility,” and 
“increase mobility.” 139 The label also made claims that Instaflex was 
“scientifically formulated,” and “clinically tested.”140 To support his 
assertions that the statements were false and misleading, Mullins cited 
several studies, including one by the National Institute of Health, 
which concluded that the Instaflex’s primary active ingredient in 
Instaflex, glucosamine, does not possess joint health benefits.141  
Defendant Direct Digital did not contest Mullins’ consumer fraud 
allegations but instead moved to defeat Mullins’ complaint on class 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015). 
137 Complaint at 1, Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 2014 WL 5461903 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 13 CV 1829). 
138 Id. at 3. 
139 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 WL 5461903, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014).  
140 Id. 
141 Complaint, supra note 135, at 2. 
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ascertainability grounds.142 Citing Carrera, Direct Digital argued that 
the court should apply the heightened ascertainability standard to its 
class certification analysis.143 Direct Digital averred that neither 
Mullins nor any proposed class member could prove that they 
purchased or used Instaflex.144 Further, Direct Digital contended that 
the studies Mullins cited to show that Instaflex did not work were 
“widely circulated and publicized.”145 Direct Digital posited that, 
unlike Mullins, consumers who were aware of these studies but 
nonetheless purchased Instaflex could not be class members because 
they were not defrauded by Direct Digital’s false claims.146 Thus, the 
inquiries into whether Mullins and members of his proposed class had 
actually used Instaflex and whether they had seen the studies would 
likely lead to individualized fact finding and mini trials.147 This would 
result in Mullins failing the heighted ascertainability test, under which 
the party seeking certification must show an administratively feasible 
means of identifying class members.148  
The District Court rejected Direct Digital’s arguments and granted 
Mullins’ motion to certify a multi-state class.149 The court did not 
address the heightened ascertainability question, instead confining its 
analysis to whether Mullins’ proposed class met the express 
requirements of Rule 23. First, the court explained that Rule 23(a)’s 
requirements of commonality and typicality were satisfied as Mullins’ 
proposed class was confined to the questions of whether Instaflex 
provided any health benefits to a person's joints and whether the 
product labeling deceived the consumer.150 These questions were 
                                                 
142 Def.’s Opp’n Mot. to Pl.’s Renewed Mot. for Class Certification at 1, 
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 2014 WL 5461903 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 13 
CV 1829). 
143 Id. at 5.  
144 Id. at 6.  
145 Id. at 2. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 5.  
149 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 WL 5461903, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014). 
150 Id. at 2. 
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common to all class members, and Mullins’ claims were typical of all 
class members because he relied on the false advertising before 
purchasing the product.151 Because these questions were “objectively 
contained” to Instaflex purchasers, the court held the class was 
ascertainable.152  
Second, the court held that Mullins had satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
requirements of predominance and superiority.153 Predominance was 
satisfied because the question of Instaflex’s efficacy were common to 
all class members; therefore, proceeding to trial as a class would 
produce a common answer as to whether the advertisements on 
Instaflex’s label were false. Turning to superiority, the court reasoned 
that the sheer size of the class would “achieve economies of time, 
effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to 
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or 
bringing about other undesirable results.”154 Direct Digital appealed to 
the Seventh Circuit. 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision 
 
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge David Frank Hamilton, 
sitting on a panel with Judge Michael Stephen Kanne and Judge 
William Joseph Bauer, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow other 
circuits in adopting the heightened ascertainability requirement to its 
class certification analysis.155 The court explained that, when deciding 
whether to certify a class, Rule 23 requires a court to balance the likely 
difficulties in managing a class against whether a class is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.156 The court stated that the heightened ascertainability 
requirement upsets this balance by giving class manageability 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 3.  
154 Id. 
155 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015). 
156 Id. 
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concerns absolute priority over superiority considerations.157 Hence, 
heightened ascertainability effectively bars any class action 
concerning goods where consumers are unlikely to have documentary 
proof of purchase.158  
 
 
1. The Established Meaning of Ascertainability in the Seventh Circuit 
 
The court made clear that it had long defined ascertainability as 
the requirement that a class be clearly defined based on objective 
criteria.159 Never, the court noted, had its analysis focused on whether, 
given an adequate class definition, it would be difficult to identify 
particular members of the class.160 In order to provide clarity to the 
Seventh Circuit’s settled ascertainability doctrine, Judge Hamilton 
listed and described three ways that a plaintiff can “flunk” the 
requirement.161 
First, classes that are defined too vaguely fail to satisfy the “clear 
definition” component. To overcome this requirement, classes must 
identify a particular group, harmed during a particular time frame, in a 
particular location, in a particular way.162 Second, classes cannot be 
defined using subjective criteria, such as a person’s state of mind.163 
As support for this proposition, the court cited Harris v. General 
Development Corp.164 There, a proposed class of “all black persons 
who were discouraged or excluded from” applying for sales jobs at 
defendant’s corporation during a defined time period was held to be 
“too imprecise and speculative” to be certified.165 Third, so-called “fail 
safe cases,” where class membership depends on the liability of the 
                                                 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 359. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 660 (citing McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 4:2). 
163 Harris v. General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
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defendant, are also not properly defined.166 Such classes raise basic 
fairness problems for the defendant: “the defendant is forced to defend 
against the class, but if a plaintiff loses, she drops out and can subject 
the defendant to another round of litigation.”167  
 
 
2. The Court Addresses the Policy Concerns Behind the Heightened 
Ascertainability Requirement 
 
Direct Digital’s argument to the Seventh Circuit boiled down to 
the notion that it would be inefficient, unfair to Direct Digital, and 
unfair to absent and bona-fide class members should the court allow 
class members to self-identify by affidavit.168 Judge Hamilton 
responded to each of these policy concerns and detailed how they 
could be addressed under Rule 23’s express requirements and under 
the Seventh Circuit’s settled understanding of class ascertainability.169  
First, the court addressed the efficiency concerns articulated in 
Carrera. The court responded to the argument that heightened 
ascertainability “eliminates serious administrative burdens” by 
ensuring easy identification of class members.170 This is accomplished 
by eliminating “extensive and individualized fact-finding or mini-
trials”.171 The court provided two reasons against applying heightened 
ascertainability on these grounds: 1) heightened ascertainability is 
superfluous because Rule 23(b)(3) already addresses case 
manageability;172 and 2) the requirement conflicts with the well-settled 
presumption that courts should not refuse to certify a class merely on 
the basis of manageability concerns.173 Judge Hamilton noted that 
                                                 
166 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660.  
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 662. 
169 Id. at 663-672. 
170 Id. at 663 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d 
Cir. 2012)). 
171 Id. (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
172 Id. (citing Luks, supra note 110, at 2395). 
173 Id. (citing Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, 
J., concurring)). 
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Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement is comparative; the rule 
requires a court to balance possible efficiencies with an eye toward 
other available methods to resolve the dispute.174 By imposing 
heightened ascertainability without considering superiority, a court 
may deny justice in a case where the requirement is difficult to satisfy 
but there is no realistic alternative to class treatment.”175  
In addition, the court pointed out that serious administrative 
problems related to identifying class members typically arise after 
settlement or judgment, when much more is known about available 
records and response rates.176 The court advised that district judges 
should wait until this stage of litigation to consider such matters, and if 
a problem is truly insoluble, the court may decertify the class.177 
Therefore, the court held that, “refusing to certify on manageability 
grounds alone should be the last resort.”178 
Second, the court addressed the notice concerns put forth in 
Carrera. Judge Hamilton rebutted the argument that the heightened 
ascertainability requirement is needed to protect absent class 
members.179 In sum, this argument states that if absent members do 
not receive actual notice of the action because they could not be 
ascertained, they lose their opt out rights and thus are unfairly bound 
by the judicial proceeding.180 Judge Hamilton noted that this premise 
is erroneous because Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the “best notice that is 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort,” not actual 
notice.181 Therefore, Rule 23 recognizes that some members may be 
impossible to identify.182 The court also noted the unlikelihood that 
someone with a claim in a low value consumer case would wish to opt 
                                                 
174 Id. at 664 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(3)). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 665 (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 
2013)). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. (quoting Shaw, supra note 25, at 2367–69).  
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out and litigate a claim individually.183 Accordingly, the court ruled, 
“due process simply does not require the ability to identify all 
members of the class at the certification stage.”184 
Third, the court addressed the concern that individuals without 
valid claims would submit fraudulent affidavits, receive a payment, 
and as a consequence dilute the share of recovery for true class 
members.185 Judge Hamilton held that Direct Digital had presented no 
evidence for this proposition, and the likelihood of that scenario 
seemed low, “perhaps to the point of being negligible,” especially 
when one considers that it is not unusual to have participation rates in 
class action cases of 10 to 15 percent and in recent cases rates lower 
than five percent.186 Moreover, the court noted that if fraudulent or 
inaccurate claims actually caused dilution, then deserving class 
members would still receive something.187 However, if certification 
were denied in case like Mullins, then the class would receive 
nothing.188 The court ruled that to accept this argument in a case like 
this would lead to the absurd result of depriving bona fide class 
members of any recovery at all as a means to ensure they do not 
recover too little.189 
Fourth, the court responded to the argument that the heightened 
ascertainability requirement is needed to protect a defendant's due 
process rights.190 The court summarized this argument with a quote 
from the Third Circuit: “[F]orcing [the defendant] to accept as true 
absent persons' declarations that they are members of the class, 
without further indicia of reliability, would have serious due process 
                                                 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 666. 
186 Id. at 667 (quoting Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: 
Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 71, 119–
20 (2007)). 
187 Id. at 668. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 669. 
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implications.”191 Judge Hamilton agreed that a defendant has a due 
process right to challenge plaintiffs' evidence at any stage of the case, 
to not pay a plaintiff in excess of its liability and to present 
individualized defenses if those defenses affect its liability.192 
However, this right does not translate into the right to ascertain the 
identity of class members with perfect accuracy at the certification 
stage.193 So long as the defendant is given a fair opportunity to 
challenge the claim to class membership and to contest the amount 
owed each claimant during the claims administration process, the 
defendant’s due process rights have been protected.194 
Lastly, the court discussed one of the core policy reasons for Rule 
23 and the class action device: deterring and punishing corporate 
wrongdoing.195 The court posited that the heightened ascertainability 
requirement effectively immunizes defendants from liability because 
they chose not to maintain records of the relevant transactions.196 To 
summarize this point, under heightened ascertainability, if the 
defendant has kept no records concerning the harmful product and a 
class member can produce none, class certification is denied and the 
defendant escapes liability. Judge Hamilton argued that such a regime 
would immunize significant corporate misconduct; therefore, a district 
judge has discretion to allow class members to identify themselves 
with their own testimony and to establish mechanisms to test those 
affidavits as needed.197 
 
IV. THE CASE FOR ABANDONING HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY  
 
In the aftermath of Carrera, the Third Circuit decided Byrd v. 
Aaron’s, Inc., where it attempted to respond to critiques of the 
                                                 
191 Id. (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 
2012)). 
192 Id. (quoting Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 
(2011)). 
193 Id. at 670-671. 
194 Id. (emphasis added). 
195 Id. at 668. 
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 669.  
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heightened ascertainability requirement and clarify its application.198 
This section responds to the Third Circuit’s attempts to save 
heightened ascertainability as a mechanism to demonstrate the 
practical difficulties in applying the requirement, its logical fallacies, 
and its tendency to promote opaque business practices and poor record 
keeping as a means to avoid liability. In addition, this section argues 
that heightened ascertainability should ultimately be abandoned as the 
policy concerns it purports to address are sufficiently resolved by the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach.  
 
A. Heightened Ascertainability Imposes a Records Requirement that 
Creates an Unnecessary Burden on Class Plaintiffs  
 
Byrd involved an invasion of privacy claim against a company 
that leased laptop computers.199 The defendant installed spyware on 
the computers that was capable of collecting screenshots, keystrokes, 
and webcam images.200 The Third Circuit certified the class, ruling 
that is was ascertainable because of the existence of objective records 
that contained full identity of the customers who leased or purchased 
the computers.201 The Byrd court declared that heightened 
ascertainability only requires a plaintiff to show a way that class 
members can be identified; it does not require her to actually identify 
the class members nor does it impose a records requirement.202 
However, it is difficult to see how a class plaintiff could surmount 
heightened ascertainability’s requirement that class members be 
identified in an “administratively feasible” manner absent a record that 
actually identifies every class member. In cases involving low cost 
products, consumers would need to keep a receipt or a can, bottle, 
tube, or wrapper of the offending item in order to succeed in bringing 
a class action.203  
                                                 
198 Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2015). 
199 Id. at 159. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 169. 
202 Id. at 164. 
203 Id. at 174-75 (Rendell, J., concurring). 
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Even in cases where defendants have kept records, heightened 
ascertainability imposes a substantial burden to certification. Indeed, 
in two other Third Circuit cases post-Marcus, class certification was 
denied when the defendants kept records of the allegedly fraudulent 
transactions and plaintiffs presented methods of identifying class 
members based on those records.204 In Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
the plaintiff brought consumer fraud claims against Wal-Mart Stores 
(“Wal-Mart”) for allegedly selling him a service plan on an “as-is” 
item not covered by the plan.205 Wal-Mart maintained the sales records 
at issue, but argued it had no way of determining which transactions 
were for “as-is” items.206 The court declared, “the nature or 
thoroughness of a defendant's recordkeeping does not alter the 
plaintiff's burden,” and de-certified the class.207 In doing so, the court 
cautioned the plaintiff that in order to prevail on remand, he must 
“offer some reliable and administratively feasible” method for the 
court to determine whether an “as-is” item was purchased.208  
As Hayes demonstrates, heightened ascertainability’s 
administrative feasibility requirement presents class plaintiffs with a 
nearly impossible burden. It narrows the availability of class actions in 
a way that the drafters of Rule 23 could not have intended.209 It is easy 
to see how; the requirement bars certification not only in cases where 
the defendant lacks records, but also in cases where the defendant 
possesses records but their consultation would not be administratively 
feasible in the opinion of the court. Comparing Byrd and Hayes 
illustrates this point. In Byrd, the plaintiff was able to certify his class 
by pointing to a clean list of names that easily identified class 
members.210 In Hayes, certification was denied because the names of 
                                                 
204 Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 2013); Haskins 
v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. CIV. 10-5044 RMB/JS, 2014 WL 294654, at *6 
(D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2014). 
205 Hayes, 725 F.3d at 352. 
206 Id. at 355. 
207 Id. at 356. 
208 Id.  
209 Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., 
concurring). 
210 Id.at 169. 
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class members were mixed with names of other purchasers and 
separating them was held to be administratively infeasible.211 As these 
cases demonstrate, unless ideal records exist, class certification in 
consumer cases will likely fail under heightened ascertainability.  
Further, as the Mullins court noted, heightened ascertainability 
conflicts with the settled proposition that courts should not deny 
certification merely on the basis of concerns over the manageability of 
identifying class members.212 Such concerns are appropriately 
addressed at the claims administration stage.213 There, courts can rely 
on a claim administrator’s various auditing processes and other 
techniques to make empirical assessment of the likelihood of fraud or 
inaccuracy.214 Thus, it is inappropriate for a court to erect hypothetical 
roadblocks to identifying class members when deciding whether to 
certify a class.215  
 
B. The Administratively Feasible Requirement is Vague and 
Inconsistently Applied 
 
The administratively feasible requirement speaks to a central 
concern of courts applying heighted ascertainability: the elimination of 
so-called “mini-trials” to identify class members.216 Such mini-trials 
are necessary to protect a defendant’s due process rights by enabling 
him to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove class 
membership.217 However, mini-trials result in “serious administrative 
burdens that are incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class 
action.”218 Yet, courts applying heightened ascertainability have failed 
to define when an inquiry into identifying class members results in a 
mini-trial or at what point a defendant’s due process rights have been 
                                                 
211 Hayes, 725 F.3d at 356. 
212 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015). 
213 Id. at 667.  
214 Id. 
215 Id.  
216 Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012). 
217 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
218 Id. 
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violated. The Byrd court declared, “Carrera does not suggest that no 
level of inquiry as to the identity of class members can ever be 
undertaken . . . [T]he size of a potential class and the need to review 
individual files to identify its members are not reasons to deny class 
certification.”219 Still, the Third Circuit denied certification in Marcus, 
Hayes, and Carrera for precisely these reasons.220 Moreover, the Third 
Circuit has been remarkably inconsistent in its rulings as to whether 
the consultation of records results in a mini-trial. For example, in In re 
Community Bank of Northern Virginia Mortgage Lending Practices 
Litigation, the Third Circuit certified a class where member 
identification required consulting the defendant’s business records and 
then “follow[ing] a few steps to determine whether the borrower is the 
real party in interest.”221 Why such an approach was not sufficient in 
Marcus and Hayes is not clear.  
Further, in Byrd, the court ruled that household members of the 
computer lessee plaintiffs could be included in the class.222 This was 
because household members could be “easily objectively verified 
through personal and public records. And their usage of the 
owner/lessee's computers can also be easily objectively 
established.”223 This reasoning is unsound. To see how, consider a 
scenario where a sibling of a class member in Byrd moved into the 
household from another state. Say this sibling began paying rent and 
living in the home but did not establish other public records to indicate 
residency. It is impossible to tell how the court could determine 
whether the sibling used the class member’s computer without 
individualized fact finding and a mini-trial. As this hypothetical 
demonstrates, applying the administratively feasible requirement is 
problematic and invites inconsistency because it is poorly defined.  
                                                 
219 Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 171 (3d Cir. 2015). 
220 Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 
356 (2011); Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593. 
221 In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., PNC Bank NA, 
795 F.3d 380, 397 (3d Cir. 2015). 
222 Byrd, 784 F.3d at 169. 
223 Id. 
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What is more, class actions inherently involve administrative 
burdens, individual inquiry, and some uncertainty.224 The Byrd court 
noted, “There will always be some level of inquiry required to verify 
that a person is a member of a class.”225 Heightened ascertainability 
imposes an unnecessary burden on plaintiffs because reviewing the 
files of persons seeking to join a class is an intrinsic part of class 
action litigation. Denying certification on these grounds is unjustified 
where the plaintiff has presented an objectively verifiable class.  
 
C. Heightened Ascertainability Incentivizes Poor Record Keeping and 
Immunizes Corporate Misconduct 
 
As the Mullins court noted, heightened ascertainability bars low-
value consumer class actions where plaintiffs do not have 
documentary proof of purchases and, sometimes, even when they 
do.226 Thus, heighted ascertainability effectively immunizes 
defendants from liability and encourages poor or no record keeping.227 
An unscrupulous corporation could market and sell a low cost dietary 
supplement it knows to be ineffective and potentially avoid civil 
liability in the Third Circuit. To do so, it would simply need to sell 
such a product to third party distributors and destroy all records of the 
transactions. The individual purchaser’s monetary claim would be so 
low that the case would never be brought except as a class action.228 
Under heightened ascertainability, a potential class could never be 
certified; affidavits are not an acceptable means to identify class 
members and there would be no records that could possibly provide a 
plaintiff with an “administratively feasible” way to identify 
purchasers. In this manner, heightened ascertainability can become a 
tool for businesses to defraud.  
 
                                                 
224 Shaw, supra note 25, at 2397. 
225 Byrd, 784 F.3d at 170. 
226 Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015). 
227 Id. at 668.  
228 Shaw, supra note 25, at 2359. 
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D. Rule 23’s Express Requirements Sufficiently Address the Policy 
Concerns Motivating Heightened Ascertainability  
 
This subsection summarizes four core points made in Mullins to 
demonstrate that heightened ascertainability is a superfluous 
requirement. First, Rule 23(b) (3) already addresses concerns about 
administrative inconvenience.229 Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority clause 
requires that a class action be superior to other available methods for 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.230 The likely 
difficulties in managing a class action are one factor in this 
determination.231 Thus, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to balance 
efficiency against other available methods of resolving the dispute.”232 
The heightened ascertainability approach upends this balance.233 It 
makes one factor unconditional and overlooks the reality that without 
certification, class members with valid small claims would receive 
nothing.234 Thus, when the realistic alternative to a class action is no 
litigation at all, a court should not deny certification based on 
efficiency considerations.235 
Second, the concern that absent class members will not receive 
notice of the suit and be denied their right to opt out of the litigation is 
addressed under Rule 23(c)(2)(B). This rule states that a “court must 
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort.”236 Thus, actual notice is not 
required under Rule 23 nor is it required to satisfy constitutional due 
process.237 If actual notice is not possible, courts may use alternative 
                                                 
229 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663. 
230 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
231 Id. 
232 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658. 
233 Id. at 558. 
234 Id. at 558, 666 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
617 (1997). 
235 See Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
236 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
237 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 
(1950).  
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means such as paid advertising without offending due process.238 
Therefore, as long as notice satisfies the standard of Rule 23(b)(3), 
there is no due process violation.239 By insisting on the identification 
of class members via an administratively feasible process, heightened 
ascertainability comes close to requiring actual notice.240 This runs 
contrary to settled law and Rule 23. Moreover, the argument that lack 
of notice would result in an absent class member being deprived of her 
right to opt out of the class action because she desired to litigate a low 
value claim like the one in Mullins is unconvincing. As Judge Posner 
noted, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”241 Thus, the concern 
that absent class members may not receive notice is not a rational 
justification for heightened ascertainability.  
Third, courts have posited that heightened ascertainability protects 
absent class members from unfairness where there is a “significant 
likelihood their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate 
claims.”242 The Mullins court held that there was no empirical 
evidence that this risk existed.243 Moreover, if a class definition is 
overbroad and there is a risk that a defendant would have to pay 
illegitimate claims, such a class would likely by blocked by Rule 
23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements.244 Hence, the claims 
dilution argument is based on nonexistent dangers that would be 
addressed by Rule 23’s express requirements, if the dangers actually 
materialized. 
Fourth, heightened ascertainability is offered as a means to protect 
a defendant’s due process right to challenge the evidence presented to 
prove class membership.245 This argument too, is without merit. Using 
                                                 
238 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665 (citing Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enterprise, Inc., 
731 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir.2013)). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 666. 
241 Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
242 Stewart v. Beam Glob. Spirits & Wine, Inc., No. CIV. 11-5149 NLH/KMW, 
2014 WL 2920806, at *10 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013). 
243 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667.  
244 Shaw, supra note 25, at 2402 (2015). 
245 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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the heightened ascertainability requirement to deny class certification 
is not the only means, or even the best means, to protect a defendant's 
due process rights.246 As long as the defendant is given the opportunity 
to challenge a class member's claim during the damages phase, the 
defendant's due process rights are protected.247  
 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS  
 
As the above analysis indicates, a return to the text of Rule 23 is 
likely the simplest solution to resolve the concerns that heightened 
ascertainability attempts to address. By strictly applying Rule 23, the 
rights of all parties in a class action will be adequately protected and 
courts will have no justification for creating new rules. However, 
courts have long accepted the doctrine of traditional ascertainability.248 
In order to limit the recent expansion of this doctrine,249 it is necessary 
to amend Rule 23 to clarify its application and limit its scope.  
There are several amendments the Judicial Conference's 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure could consider to 
achieve this end. First, the Committee could codify ascertainability as 
an additional prerequisite to Rule 23(a). For example: 
 
23(a)(5): the class is adequately defined by objectively specifying 
a particular group that was harmed during a particular time frame, in a 
particular location, in a particular way.250 
 
This proposed prerequisite provides a precise definition of 
ascertainability and address concerns relating to overbroad or poorly 
defined classes. Moreover, it speaks to the concern over administrative 
inefficiency. The efficiency of identifying class members is maximized 
if the class is objectively defined. Second, a limiting sentence could be 
                                                 
246 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671. 
247 Id. (citing Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., No. 13–cv–02998–JST, 2014 WL 
4652283, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014)).  
248 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:1. 
249 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657. 
250 McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 4:2. 
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added to Rule 23(b) to reign in the ascertainability doctrine’s scope. 
For example: 
 
23(b)(3): the court finds that the questions of law or fact common 
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.251 When making this determination, a court should not 
consider the administrative feasibility or efficiency of identifying class 
members in its analysis (proposed amendment in italics). 
 
This proposed amendment would bar courts from denying 
certification due to the defendant’s lack or records, the defendant’s 
poor record keeping or hypothetical difficulties in consulting the 
defendant’s records. The above amendments deserve consideration. 
The current state of the law puts class plaintiffs in some circuits at a 
significant disadvantage because they are unable to certify a class 
without documentary evidence that actually identifies every potential 
class member. This effectively bars consumer class actions and 
severely limits any class action where the defendant has kept complex 
records. Such judicially created restrictions on class certification 
attack the core purposes of Rule 23 and should be abandoned. Only 
then will all class plaintiffs have the ability to seek relief in the courts 
and will companies engaged in deceitful practices be held accountable.  
 
 
                                                 
251 FED. R. CIV. P.23. 
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